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COMMENTS
tfosorciM and croMiftos:
Why High-Technology Antitrust Inquiry
Is Backwards and Inside-Out
When Robin Hood undertook to rob his fellow-citizens he took
his life in his hand, and with at least some sort of courage took the
consequences of his crimes, but these modern footpads have not the
grace of his courage, but commit their robberies by stealth.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The recent government prosecution of Microsoft under section 2 of
the Sherman Act is the most controversial antitrust case in a generation.
Indeed, there was extensive criticism of the Clinton administration from
the political right for pursuing the case at all. Similarly, the political left
criticized the Bush administration for its leniency in the Microsoft prose-
cution. The controversy stemmed from the debate over two antitrust
issues: 1) when it is appropriate to prosecute under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act, and 2) what is the appropriate role of antitrust in complex,
fast-changing, high-technology markets?
Notably, there are additional considerations that did not play a sig-
nificant part in the public debate. For instance, some corporations
accused of being in violation of antitrust laws make enormous contribu-
tions to charity. Should these social benefits be part of the antitrust
calculus? If there is a place for consideration of these social benefits,
should the Federal Trade Commission or other governmental agency
consider them in deciding whether to prosecute the alleged antitrust vio-
lator? Perhaps the judiciary, instead, should factor in societal benefits
when determining liability.
An important subtext to consider is that while many things change
in the economy and society, others remain the same. Commentators
suggest that high technology poses numerous challenges to antitrust
analysis.2 While this is true, different challenges to antitrust analysis
1. 20 CONG. REC. S3445 at 1457 (1889), reprinted in 3 American Landmark Legislation
1976, 34 (statement of Sen. Jones).
2. See generally STAN J. LEIBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS &
MIcRosoFT COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY 54 (1999).
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have occurred repeatedly throughout history.3 Yet, the reality is that
anticompetitive behavior continues, but companies hide such disfavored
activity from the public.
This Comment will explore these issues, focusing particularly on
whether antitrust doctrines are relevant to high-technology markets. Part
II begins with an explanation of fundamental economic principles as a
foundation for antitrust analysis. That section describes the analysis
used in antitrust review as it pertains to the dominant firms in high tech-
nology markets. Moreover, in subpart A of Part II, this Comment dis-
cusses the economic analysis, which happens to be difficult to conduct
because the measurements of market definition, relevant market, and
market power are particularly unclear for high-tech companies.4 Using
these popular economic analyses, the next question is: How do these
economic principles fit within the various antitrust doctrines?
Using those fundamental economic principles, Part II B describes
tie-in arrangements. The primary concern with tie-ins is the ease with
which a high-tech company can incorporate many products to appear as
one. Under such a scenario, anticompetitive activity may create many
problems for the market, as well as for consumers. Section II C, looks at
the positive and negative aspects of network effects. Following the net-
work effects line of reasoning, Part II C continues by describing barriers
to entry. The barrier to entry concept indicates either an attempt to
exclude competitors or the ability of competitors to enter the market
freely.
One negative consequence of these network effects and barriers to
entry is the development of monopoly and predatory practices. Part II D
discusses how these activities relate to the high-technology industry. In
Part II E the Comment describes the pro-high-technology antitrust com-
mentators' assertions that speed of change and slowness of the judiciary
make antirust law irrelevant. Part II closes in subpart F with a short
discussion of whether the Sherman Act is the right tool for the high-
technology market.
In the high-technology industry, perhaps the judicial inquiry should
follow a traditional approach - the more predictable path. That is, the
antitrust analysis would take into consideration economic efficiencies
and give little importance to consumer welfare5 in validating the avoid-
3. One need only look to the debates surrounding the railroad industry at its birth as an
example of the notion that monopoly seemed palatable because of the perceived benefits.
4. Considering the difficulty of economic analysis and the various opinions concerning these
analyses, this is considerably more challenging than one might believe it to be at first glance.
5. Consumer welfare is a concept that this Comment uses throughout its analysis to refer to
the totality of benefits consumers receive, excluding matters concerning health and safety. See
Robert A. Skitol, The Shifting Sands of Antitrust Policy: Where it has Been, Where Now, Where it
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ance of an antitrust prosecution. Part III of this Comment suggests that
the discretionary aspects of enforcing antitrust regulations through eval-
uating consumer welfare would give the government an opportunity to
refrain from pursuing companies that voluntarily disgorge monopoly
profits.6 Indeed, the government could balance the social benefit created
by an organization against the anticompetitive activity to establish a
guideline for determining whether to prosecute.7
Social benefits analysis could be used to differentiate between com-
panies that ought to be subject to prosecution and those that add ample
public benefit and, thus, should not. Such an analysis parallels the tax-
exempt organization inquiry performed by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS). Part III A discusses this public-versus-private concept using the
tax-exempt organization test as an analogy. Exempt-organization analy-
sis seems particularly well-suited to the antitrust inquiry because argua-
bly the courts demonstrate similar reasoning within contemporary
antitrust inquiry. Ultimately, by keeping this prosecutorial balancing
test outside of the antitrust test, the judicial inquiry can focus exclu-
sively on the anticompetitive behavior.
An important backdrop and underlying principle to this Comment
is the Sherman Act's primary concern: protecting competition and not
competitors. This seems contrary to the common conception of the anti-
trust goal, namely, protecting competitors.8 Consider, for example, the
will be in its Third Century, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 248-49 (1999) (discussing Robert
Bork's analysis of the "Chicago School philosophy in a broadly influential 1978 book entitled,
The Antitrust Paradox: A Policy at War with Itself. An understanding of the thrust of this
philosophy is critical to an appreciation of what has happened to antitrust policy from the end of
the 1970s to our day.").
6. As this Comment states, there exists the inference that discretionary government
prosecution of anything, particularly antitrust regulations, stems from the political environment
within which the government operates. See, e.g., Holman W. Jenkins Jr., All Wires Lead to
Washington, WALL ST. J., Jul 5, 2000, at A23. Jenkins argues, "Those who gurgle about the 'rule
of law' in antitrust don't know, or have forgotten, that antitrust enforcement has always been an
area of untrammeled policy initiative masquerading as law enforcement." Thus, an alternate
method of effectively discriminating between warranted and unwarranted prosecutions is
necessary.
7. This position is contrary to the stated analysis involved in many antitrust situations.
Despite the palpable aversion to weighing social benefits, the mere fact that economic benefits are
considered somewhat belies that aversion. Indeed economic goals are arguably societal benefits.
This Comment uses "social benefits" to refer to the benefits received by society in general.
Those benefits may relate to health and safety.
8. Milton A. Marquise, Remarks at The Eighteenth Annual National Regulatory Conference,
Safe Harbor or Uncharted Waters? Antitrust, Market Power, and Regulatory Oversight Panelists,
Antitrust and Market Power, in 7 RICH. J.L. & Tech. 2 (2000). As an example of the perception
that antitrust protects the competitor, it is useful to consider reports on the manner in which a
competitor was harmed by the predatory behavior of an alleged Sherman Act violator. See, e.g.,
Thomas Sowell, Predatory Prosecution, FORBES, May 3, 1999, at 89.
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skeptical view at least one writer expressed about the legal analysis in
antitrust litigation:
The courts have long paid lip service to the distinction that econo-
mists make between competition - a set of economic conditions -
and existing competitors, though it is hard to see how much differ-
ence that has made in judicial decisions. Too often, it seems, if you
have hurt competitors, then you have hurt competition, as far as the
judges are concerned.9
Perhaps the above idea stresses only a semantic difference.' Neverthe-
less, this Comment discusses the antitrust analysis applied to high-tech
markets with an eye toward protecting competition and the associated
benefits.
Clearly, the idea that Robin Hood" took from the rich and gave to
the poor does not change the fact that Robin Hood was a thief. Yet,
does the metaphor suggest that those who are involved in a theft, done
for a greater good, may attain forgiveness? Extending that idea even
further, it seems that the altruistic activity of an organization helps that
organization better align itself with the positive concept associated with
the Robin Hood ideal, thereby avoiding the negative connotations
described as "these modern footpads have not the grace of his cour-
age. .." Is Microsoft Robin Hood?
9. See Sowell, supra note 8.
10. If it is true that competition, rather than the competitors, is protected, the civil remedy is
ironic as only a competitor is able to seek relief. id. See also Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile
Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 266 (7th Cir. 1984). On the other hand, entities within the market are the
best candidates to bring an action because they have the business experience to know the manner
in which the anticompetitive activity is harming the market. See, e.g., W. KiP. Viscusi ET AL.,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 73 (2d ed. 1995) (1992).
The concepts discussed thus far and those to be discussed later in this Comment depend on
certain assumptions. One major assumption here is perfect competition:
[T]he theoretical world of perfect competition. Every microeconomics text devotes
much attention to the perfectly competitive model. The key assumptions are:
1. Consumers are perfectly informed about all goods, all of which are private goods.
2. Producers have production functions that rule out increasing returns to scale and
technological change.
3. Consumers maximize their preferences given budget constraints; producers
maximize profits given their production functions.
4. All agents are price takers, and externalities among agents are ruled out.
5. A competitive equilibrium, that is, a set of prices such that all markets clear, is
then determined.
Id.
II. See CONG. REC., supra note 1.
12. Id.
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II. ECONOMIC BASICS: DOES ANTITRUST APPLY TO
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY MARKETS?
Some commentators argue that the antitrust laws, which seek to
remedy an aggregation of market power under one firm, should not
apply to the high-tech industry. 13 Others argue just the opposite.' 4
As a demonstration of some of the points on both sides of this argu-
ment, consider first that the fast-changing nature of the high-tech indus-
try mitigates the harm because continuous improvements and innovation
lessen the likelihood of sustained monopoly. 15 Conversely, the exis-
tence of a monopoly may suffocate innovation because the monopolist
has less incentive to innovate, and the monopolist's exclusionary
actions, intended to secure monopoly profits, may push the monopolist
to exclude new entrants from the market despite the innovative technolo-
gies they bring. Second, some suggest that network effects' 6 are value-
adding and provide helpful benefits for the consumer of high-technology
products and services.' 7 Moreover, there could be a net gain to eco-
nomic efficiencies when considering the positive effects of productive
efficiency gains due to suggested short-term monopoly versus the allo-
cative efficiency losses arising from monopoly. On the other hand, net-
work effects are also associated with barriers to entry, 8 which suggests
that strong affinities to the benefits reaped deter innovation.
Using this debate as a backdrop, to determine whether Microsoft -
or, for that matter, any other high-technology marketer - is Robin
Hood, some initial standards must be established. Those standards build
on economic principles. The primary, and perhaps most important, eco-
nomic principle for the purposes of this Comment is market power.
Before discussing market power, it is important to note that there
have been opposing views of the standard. These views depend upon
which side of the high-tech antitrust argument you support. One side
13. See generally LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2.
14. See generally Robert Pitofsky, Remarks at the F.T.C. Antitrust, Technology and
Intellectual Property Conference (Mar. 2, 2001) at 2001 WL 206413. (Robert Pitofsky is the
chairman of the F.T.C.). Notably, this Comment deals with issues such as monopoly, tying and
predation as those concepts relate to high-tech markets but does not address price fixing laws.
15. See infra text Part II E. Consider the money spent by the government in pursuit of
eliminating a monopoly that is self-defeated before the court remedy could be exacted. See, e.g.,
infra text accompanying note 165. The "moving target" concept, as defined for the purposes of
this Comment, refers to the likelihood that anticompetitive activity concerns a product or service
that will likely change or become obsolete before a court could resolve the underlying dispute.
16. See infra text Part II C & D.
17. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic
Network Industries, Address Before Software Publishers Association (Mar. 24, 1998), at 1998
WL 1769814 at *14.
18. See infra text Part II C.
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argues that antitrust law is an inappropriate way to govern competition
in the high-technology market. Predictably, these commentators' market
power analyses stress those factors that deal with efficiency.19 Alterna-
tively, the opposition proposes a market power standard that focuses on
the virtues of competitiveness.20
Nevertheless, both sides of the high-tech antitrust argument disa-
gree on the extent to which large participants in high-tech markets have
market power and its dangers. 21 Relying on this principle, consider the
initial economic analysis of a simple monopoly where price is set when
marginal cost (MC) equals marginal revenue (MR).22 The effect of set-
ting the price according to MC = MR is that some consumers, not pre-
pared to pay the monopoly price, are likely to switch to another product
they desire less. The net effect of this behavior on the economy is a loss
of efficiency.23
19. See infra text this Part.
20. See infra Parts II B & E.
21. ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 2 (Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds.,
1989).
The intellectual foundation for the structural approach to antitrust policy is
contained in the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. The paradigm states that
market power (that is, the ability to restrict output and raise price) is determined by
a few key elements of market structure, in particular, market share, concentration,
and barriers to entry.
22. See Richard A. Posner, The Theory of Monopoly, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
LAW 22 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 2d.ed. 1979). Marginal cost is the additional cost
associated with an additional unit produced and marginal revenue is the revenue associated with
one additional unit sold. Accordingly, "[tihe monopoly price . . . is the price that a company
having no competition or fear thereof would charge." Id.
23. Id. at 17. Consider the following discussion of efficiency:
There are four fundamental aspects of efficiency, distinguished as follows:
1) "Technical efficiency": a company produces a certain level of output by using the
minimum level of physical inputs; an example of technical inefficiency is when
more people than necessary are used to carry out a certain task.
2) "Allocative efficiency": a company uses inputs in the right proportion (for given
input prices) to produce a certain level of output; an example of allocative
inefficiency is when the wrong people carry out the wrong tasks (i.e. wrong input
mix), for instance when company managers dedicate time to secretarial tasks such
as typing instead of thinking how best to run the company.
3) "Economic efficiency": a company produces a certain level of output at the
lowest feasible costs; costs may rise above the lowest possible level due to lack of
either technical or allocative efficiency.
It should be clear from the above that economic efficiency is a more stringent
requirement than technical or allocative efficiency. Both technical and allocative
efficiency are required to achieve economic efficiency.
Finally when time is taken into account the relevant concept is:
4) "Dynamic efficiency": a company's output is economically-efficient (i.e. a
certain level of output at minimum costs) over time.
John Cubbin & George Tzanidakis, Techniques for Analysing Company Performance, Bus.
STRATEGY REV. (Winter 1998), at 39 (first emphasis added).
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The loss of economic efficiency in a high-tech market could
include a decrease in innovation24 because "a monopolist has less of an
incentive to innovate . . . [in fact, the predacious company] gains less
than a new entrant to the market. 'z5 As a result, innovation would cause
a monopolist to switch existing profits for the newly created product,
whereas a market entrant realizes profits earlier in production. 26 Some-
what counterintuitive is the fact that "the net gain to the entrant will be
greater than to the monopolist... "27 Furthermore, exclusionary behav-
ior tends to reduce the benefits of innovation because there is a chilling
effect on the incentive to develop new high-tech products. Unfortu-
nately, it is not easy to understand the impact of today's competition
restrictions on the innovations of the future. Nevertheless, there is an
immeasurable loss of future efficiency.
Another ramification of inefficiency is the likely market selection
by consumers of inferior products for the sake of compatibility. 28 These
market reactions hinder economic adjustments for consumer tastes,
changes in income, and changes in technology, because the consumers'
market response reflects inefficient decision-making. 9
Conversely, the economic model of a competitive market allows
supply and demand (the measure of producer and consumer behavior) to
determine the market price.3" Price inflexibility and rigidity, hallmarks
of monopoly, are exclusively manifestations of the producers' behav-
ior.3 ' Any downward price movements occur because the monopolist
adjusts output and the employment of the factors of production, 32
24. U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
Testimony from Dean Richard Schmalensee, Dean of MIT's Sloan School of
Management, that dividing Microsoft likely would "harm consumers through higher
prices, lower output, reduced efficiency, and less innovation" and would "produce
immediate, substantial increases in the prices of both Windows and Office" (internal
citation omitted).
25. The Institute for Fiscal Studies, Innovations and market structure, at http://
www.ifs.org.uk/innovation/innovations.shtml (last modified Jan. 22, 2001).
For the purposes of this Comment, "new entrant" means a person or company that has not
been selling goods, providing services or both in or through the subject market.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. LEIBOWITz & MAROOLIS, supra note 2. Economic inefficiency denotes that there is a
viable alternative available, which Leibowitz and Margolis refer to as third-degree path
dependence.
29. David R. Kamerschen, The Economic Effects of Monopoly: A Lawyers Guide to Antitrust
Economics, in ECONOMIc ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 33 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried
eds., 1979).
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. According to standard economic theory, there are three factors of production-
land, labour and capital. In practice, in modem expositions, land is often
amalgamated with capital, and we are left with only two factors-labour and
2003]
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instead of allowing the market forces of supply and demand to control
price.33
This economic analysis may be pedagogically interesting for some,
but it also affects the high-tech industry by showing how anticompeti-
tive behavior affects the market. One of the anticompetitive influences
is network effects (i.e., increased product value through expansive use
effectively excluding rivals). 34 Network effects is the power associated
with incumbent technology causing people to be reluctant to use differ-
ent products. This exists in many familiar situations - for example, the
pervasive use of VHS videotapes over Beta videotapes although it was
widely argued that the Beta format was superior. Another example is
the rise to dominance by Microsoft's Windows software.
In each of these cases, the power of interchangeability adds to the
product's value. Consider that few individuals use the Beta format or
any computer operating platform other than Windows. The reason for
such limited use of these other formats is that each person benefits from
the widespread use of the standardized product. This is similar to net-
work externalities 35 (i.e., the negative or positive effects of networks in a
market).
One danger of network externalities is the potential for waste of
economic resources because of the restrictions on the employment of
those resources. 36 At least one commentator described the waste of eco-
nomic resources associated with concentrated market power-one of the
possible byproducts of network externalities:
capital. This may be useful for some broad-brush analyses of economic growth and
distribution. But for many crucial problems this simplification is unsatisfactory.
For the simplification omits an essential factor of production, without which growth
and technical progress would be impossible. That factor is entrepreneurship.
Harold Lydall, Enterprise: The Missing Factor, ECON. AFF., Feb. 1991, at 27.
33. See Kamerschen, supra note 29, at 33.
34. See generally LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 18, 143.
35. Melissa A. Schilling, Technology Success and Failure in Winner-Take-All Markets: The
Impact of Learning Orientation, Timing, and Network Externalities, 45 ACAD. MGMT. J., 387,
388-89 (2002)
Network externalities arise when a user's benefit from using a technology increases
with the number of other users employing the same technology .... The classic
examples occur in markets involving physical networks, such as railroads or
telecommunications; however, network externalities can also arise in markets that
do not have physical networks. For example, a user's benefit may increase with the
number of users of the same good when compatibility is important .... When an
industry is characterized by network externalities, a technology's installed base and
the availability of complementary goods will play major roles in user adoption -
an insufficient installed base or lack of complementary goods may result in
technological lockout (internal citations omitted).
36. Charles A. Holt & David T. Scheffman, Strategic Business Behavior and Antitrust, in
EcONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 55 (Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989).
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Concentrated economic power . . . ma[kes] it possible to hold up
prices in the face of technological advances and increased productiv-
ity; and this, in turn, ... [leads] to maldistribution, the accumulation
of excess savings, the failure of mass purchasing power, and a
decline in private investment opportunities. It mean[s], first, that a
disproportionate share of the national income [is] . . . withheld as
savings.... [S]econdly, that real purchasing power [is] ... diverted
from consumers, farmers, and laborers, the classes that created the
mass market, upon which the profitable investment of these accumu-
lated savings depend[.] And thirdly .... the natural forces of adjust-
ment c[an] no longer bring about economic recovery. In the face of
falling demand, the normal choice of the businessman . . . to cut
production in preference to lowering prices, a choice that thr[o]w[s]
laborers out of work, reduce[s] their income, and thus cut[s] purchas-
ing power that much more.37
In addition, anticipated disincentive toward inventiveness when facing
significant network effects creates a barrier to entry. 38 For example, any
competing operating system to Windows would arise only when the
competitor had a sufficient selection of compatible applications, in order
to ensure consumers that the assortment to choose from would equal that
of Windows.39
On the other hand, assuming the new entrant accumulated many
different computer programs suitable for the operating system, the con-
sumer may still resist the change because of the varied and expansive
inventory compatible with Windows.4" As such, the investment
required to develop an attractive network deters new entrants.4 Not to
mention the fact that the new entrant would need to persuade software
creators to develop programs for it.
42
In light of this economic analysis, this Comment suggests that anti-
37. ELLIS WAYNE HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY: A STUDY IN
ECONOMIC AMBIVALENCE 174-75 (1995) (1966).
38. See, e.g., Lawrence J. White, The Revolution in Antitrust Analysis of Vertical
Relationships: How Did We Get from There to Here?, in ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 113
(Robert J. Lamer & James W. Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989).
Vertical relationships represent those interactions between companies involved in the same
distribution channel. Consider Microsoft: as a software manufacturer, its vertical components
include wholesalers, distributors, and retailers. Most of the interesting antitrust analysis rests in
these business arrangements because such associations create a difficult choice between the
benefits produced by the combination of products and services with the negative effect on
competition.
39. Gregory J. Werden, Network Effects and Conditions of Entry: Lessons from The Microsoft
Case, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 87, 95 (2001) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d. 9,
20 (D.D.C. 1999)).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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trust implications are visibly meaningful as a system to ensure a compet-
itive marketplace, even in cases of high-tech markets. Yet, in an attempt
to diminish antirust effectiveness, the high-technology marketers may
seek to introduce new or altered analyses, thereby weakening the checks
on trade restraint.43 Despite this reality, judicial analysis nevertheless
delves into complex concepts such as market power, tie-in, market struc-
ture, and entry barriers. Each of these doctrines should remain applica-
ble under the Sherman Act regardless of the high-tech market
counterarguments.44
A. Market Power:
Heavily manipulated, market power is a tool needed to understand
antitrust litigation. Demonstrating this manipulation is the varied mean-
ing assigned to market power: (1) a firm's ability to control price
through the manipulation of output,45 (2) a company's ability to vary
profitably from competitive pricing,46 and (3) an inference of market
43. See, e.g., Appellant's Opening Brief at 68-83, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
34 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (No. 00-5212) available at 2000 WL 33174760, at *40-53 [hereinafter
Appellant's Brief].
44. Although there may not be actual organizations that manifest the pure form of monopoly,
the application of the analysis is proper as a way to better understand the dynamics of the market
within which the firm competes.
45. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 3.1, 55 (Students
ed. 1985). An important distinction is that 'market power is not exclusionary (as compared to
monopoly) although exclusion of competitors is a tool to increase market power, but it attracts
competition because of the supracompetitve price.
46. Id. at 57. See also Notices: Federal Trade Commission Request for Views on Draft
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors, 64 Fed. Reg. 54484, 54488 (Oct. 6,
1999).
If the nature of the agreement and the absence of market power together
demonstrate the absence of anticompetitive harm, the Agencies do not challenge the
agreement. Alternatively, where the likelihood of anticompetitive harm is evident
from the nature of the agreement, or anticompetitive harm has resulted from an
agreement already in operation, then, absent overriding benefits that could offset the
anticompetitive harm, the Agencies challenge such agreements without a detailed
market analysis.
(citing Bd. of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Cal. Dental
Ass'n v. F.T.C., 526 U.S. 756, 768, 778-79 (1999); F.T.C. v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447,
459 (1986); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 104, 106-10 (1984)
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market power is to
determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition, "proof of actual detrimental effects, such as a reduction of output," can
obviate the need for an inquiry into market power, which is but a "surrogate for
detrimental effects."
Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. at 459-60 (quoting Phillip E. Areeda, VII ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 1511 (1986).
Note that "[the absence of] market power... may be determined without defining a relevant
market. For example, if no market power is likely under any plausible market definition, it does
not matter which one is correct." Notices: Federal Trade Commission Request for Views on Draft
1284
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power drawn from the relative market share held by a company.47
Nearly all antitrust litigation requires a showing of market power;48 the
degree of control varying depending on the claim.49
Since the preceding economic analysis is difficult, the courts may
rely on market share as well as barriers to entry5 ° as substitutes for mar-
ket power.-" However, the problem is that "[m]arket share is only an
imperfect proxy for market power.... The... relevant variables [are]:
market share, market demand elasticity, . . . the elasticity of supply of
competing and fringe firms[,]"52 and barriers to entry. Whether looking
at market power or market share, the court must first determine the rele-
vant market. 3
In defining the relevant market, the court could simply, or maybe
not so simply, 54 group all companies by geographic market boundaries
or group those companies that produce the same good or service. The
more scientific method for defining a market is using cross-elasticity
Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations among Competitors, 64 Fed. Reg. 54484, 54488 n.27 (Oct.
6, 1999).
47. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also United States v. E.
I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
48. One exception to the rule is price fixing. See, e.g., Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 468
U.S. at 100.
[P]rice fixing and output limitation are ordinarily condemned as a matter of law
under an "illegal per se" approach because the probability that these practices are
anticompetitive is so high; a per se rule is applied when "the practice facially
appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output."
(quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979)). Price fixing
is not fully analyzed in this Comment, in part because price fixing was not a major issue in the
Microsoft case.
49. See generally HOVENKCAMP, supra note 45, at 56.
50. See infra Part II C.
51. HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 58 (there is a "positive correlation between market share
and market power.").
52. Id. If the two elasticity variables remain constant, then market share and market power
vary proportionately.
53. Id. at 59.
54. To see the complications of market definition, which upon first glance seems to be a
simple matter, see United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1945).
55. Douglas Needham, Substitutability Criteria for Market Definition, in ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW 78 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 1979). One major
challenge is determining what products and services belong with others. Arguing narrowly, every
product and service is different making the definition unworkable. Conversely, all goods and
services compete for the same consumer; therefore, they are all in the same market. This is,
however, just as unworkable as the more narrow view. See also, Kenneth D. Boyer, Industry
boundaries, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANrIRUST LAW 96 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds.,
1979).
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Despite the challenges with understanding, applying and formulating
elasticity measurements, the analysis, nevertheless, gives insight to the
concept of relevant market. In practice, cross-elasticity measures the
tendency to substitute either goods and services on the consumer's side,
or resources on the supply side.58 "The degree of substitutability, as
measured by the cross-elasticity of demand, [or supply], is used both to
define the boundaries of an industry, as well as to measure the degree of
product differentiation and thus classify market structures. 59
Thus far, the market definition analysis limitation, consistent in
nearly all economic analysis, is a result of the difficulty in measuring
elasticity. 6° For instance, identifying the level at which there is suffi-
cient substitutability to enable a court to define the appropriate grouping
of producers is difficult; economic elasticity theories do not effectively
help the courts with the market definition.6 Alternatively, and perhaps
more appropriately, the Department of Justice implements the following
guideline for determining market definition:
The first task in market definition is to determine what products to
include in the market for the product of the merging firm. In general,
56. See generally Needham, supra note 55; Boyer, supra note 55.
57. The courts take into account a variety of considerations when defining the relevant
market. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320-21, n.36 (1962).
[F]or example, that a whole or material part of the competitive activity of an
enterprise, which had been a substantial factor in competition, had been eliminated;
that the relative size of the acquiring corporation had increased to such a point that
its advantage over competitors threatened to be "decisive"; that an "undue" number
of competing enterprises had been eliminated; or that buyers and sellers in the
relevant market had established relationships depriving their rivals of a fair
opportunity to compete.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 81-1191, at 8 (1949)).
58. See Needham, supra note 55 at 79.
Cross elasticity of demand = % change in quantity of a good or service demanded
% change in the price of a different good or service
% change in quantity of a good or service supplied
% change in the price of a different good or service
59. Boyer, supra note 55, at 90. See also Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 423-24. For an
alternative view on market definitions, see Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Serv's, Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 470 n.15 (1992) (finding "the ultimate inquiry is ... whether competition in the
equipment market will significantly restrain power in the service and parts markets."). Market
definition has its critics. See, e.g., David A Huettner, Product Market Definition in Antitrust
Cases When Products are Close Substitutes or Close Complements, 47 ANTITRUST BULL. 133
(2002) ("judicial acceptance of the Department of Justice (DOJ) Merger Guidelines over the past
decade has standardized the methodology economists use to define markets in antitrust cases. This
conceptual success, however, masks the fact that economic practitioners continue to reach
divergent market definitions using identical methodology.") (footnote omitted).
60. Needham, supra note 55, at 80.
61. Id. at 81.
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the Department seeks to identify a group of products such that a
hypothetical firm that was the only present and future seller of those
products could raise price profitably. That is, assuming that buyers
could respond to an increase in price for a tentatively identified prod-
uct group only by shifting to other products, what would happen? If
readily available alternatives were, in the aggregate, sufficiently
attractive to enough buyers, an attempt to raise price would not prove
profitable, and the "market" would prove to have been too narrowly
defined.62
The cross-elasticity determination, however, does help the court
understand the impact of any firm's actions on other organizations' pric-
ing behavior and, thus, hints at the scope of the relevant market.63 In
fact, a close reading of the Department of Justice guidelines indicates
that the factors considered constitute an elasticity-type inquiry. In par-
ticular, the Department of Justice delineated specific factors that should
be considered when defining the relevant market:
In constructing and expanding the provisional market, the Depart-
ment will not exclude any product that is at least as good a substitute
as any product included. The Department will refer to the products
included in the market collectively as the "relevant product."
(1) Evidence of buyers' perceptions that the products are or are not
substitutes, particularly if those buyers have shifted purchases
between the products in response to changes in relative price or other
competitive variables;
(2) Similarities or differences between the products in customary
usage, design, physical composition and other technical
characteristics;
(3) Similarities or differences in the price movements of the products
over a period of years; and
(4) Evidence of sellers' perceptions that the products are or are not
substitutes, particularly if business decisions have been based on
those perceptions. 64
A shortcoming of confining market definition to elasticity analysis
is a possible failure to consider potential competitors.65 In other words,
action may constitute anticompetitive behavior possibly directed at firms
62. Notices: Department of Justice Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg.
28493, 28494 (June 30, 1982) (internal citations omitted).
63. Needham, supra note 55, at 82. Cross-elasticity analysis does not include allowances for
competitive responses. As such, these measurements do indicate whether there will be a response,
although it fails to provide a description of the type of response.
64. Notices: Department of Justice Antitrust Division Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28493
at, n. 12 (June 30, 1982).
65. Terry Calvani & John Siegfried, Introduction in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST
LAW 272 (Terry Calvani & John Siegfried eds., 1979).
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not yet in the market.66 However, there is a possibility that the scope of
the defined market, with the intent to protect new entrants, may become
too broad so that regulations defeat the pursuit of economic efficiencies
(i.e., economies of scale).6 7 Understanding not only that there will be a
competitor response to a firm's activity, but also where the response will
come from, generally helps the court understand the antitrust
implications.68
In the high-technology market, there exists an especially cloudy
market definition.69 For example, common to all those who use com-
puters, the way in which the different companies connect their products
or services (i.e., between the hard drive manufacturer, operating system
developer, and the Internet provider) is unimportant to the user. Argua-
bly, most people simply know that they have Microsoft Windows. Con-
sidering all the interdependence between hardware, software and
Internet organizations, drawing the line defining the relevant market
becomes even more complicated.70 Arguably, it could be that under the
market definition guidelines as set out by the Department of Justice, all
successful high-tech companies are monopolists.
The reason for believing that all successful high-tech companies are
monopolist under the Department of Justice analysis is that product dif-
ferentiation is thinning as technology developers look for more ways to
create transparency and compatibility for the user. Eventually, perhaps,
there will be one master to which all other developers answer. This is
precisely the situation Microsoft detractors argue exists in the computer
market. Is this situation the same as Robin Hood and his band of merry
men?
On the other hand, does that argument defeat overall consumer wel-
fare? Assuming there is a "crackdown" on antitrust violators, would the
consequences for successful prosecution cause greater harm than good?
For instance, these market definition tools might create a situation where
market power is easily established. If market power accumulation were
to occur, would the consumer no longer be able to fulfill his ever-
increasing desire for more technology because the companies that could
develop this technology no longer desire to do so, assuming the return
on capital decreases? This Comment suggests that the broader the mar-
66. Situations could occur where a firm with market power in software acquires developing
companies that may create competitive products to avoid any competitive interference.
67. Calvani & Siegfried, supra note 65.
68. Id.
69. See generally LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2.
70. See generally Skitol, supra note 5. Reviewing the changes, over time, the author
expresses some of the increasing difficulties with antitrust law as it relates to high-technology
markets.
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ket, the more likely greater returns, but at the risk of tolerating greater
perceived market power with which to abuse competition.
B. Tie-Ins7 Generally:
Many of the worries concerning antitrust law in the high-technol-
ogy realm deal with tie-in arrangements.72 Tying is, generally, the sale
or lease of one product made dependent on the sale or lease of another.7 3
Consider, for example, the economic incentive to engage in tying
arrangements:
When the seller's power is just used to maximize its return in the
tying product market, where presumably its product enjoys some jus-
tifiable advantage over its competitors, the competitive ideal of the
Sherman Act is not necessarily compromised. But if that power is
used to impair competition on the merits in another market, a poten-
tially inferior product may be insulated from competitive pressures.74
71. Tie-ins traditionally have been found to be a per se violation of the Sherman Act. See
Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
72. "Tying is a form of marketing in which a seller insists on selling two distinct products or
services as a package." Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
See LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 249-52. The authors, in this section, suggest
that tie-ins are a manifestation of monopoly power from within one market to another. In so
doing, the authors explain the harm is not as apparent as in traditional notions of tying. On the
other hand, tying is a business strategy that not only adds to the businesses performance but also
benefits consumers.
For instance, the consumer is able to gain cost and quality benefits from the value added to
the product through the tying arrangement. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18 (stating that
the tying could result in "merely providing a functionally integrated package of services" that
arguably benefit the consumer). In addition, the competitive advantage could induce new entrants
to become competitors because of the marketing advantage arising from the tie-in. See id. at 24.
Justice O'Connor argued in Jefferson Parish that "[w]hen the economic advantages of joint
packaging are substantial the package is not appropriately viewed as two products, and that should
be the end of the tying inquiry." Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
One need only look as far as the Microsoft antitrust arguments for the application of the
Jefferson Parish opinion and concurrence. See, e.g., Appellant's Brief at 68-83. Much of
Microsoft's argument stressed that there was not a tied product and in the alternative maintained
that there was no negative effect on competition. But see Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 68-86
(holding that the traditional per se rule is inappropriate, as was the case in Jefferson Parish).
We hold that the rule of reason, rather than per se analysis, should govern the
legality of tying arrangements involving platform software products. . . . While
every "business relationship" will in some sense have unique features, some
represent entire, novel categories of dealings. As we shall explain, the arrangement
before us is an example of the latter, offering the first up-close look at the
technological integration of added functionality into software that serves as a
platform for third-party applications. There being no close parallel in prior antitrust
cases, simplistic application of per se tying rules carries a serious risk of harm.
Id. at 84.
73. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 214.
74. Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 15.
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Accordingly, the courts must test for the existence of tying arrange-
ments, but there is little consistency in the application of the test.7 5
Despite the fact that courts pulled back from the per se rule, tied prod-
ucts today, nevertheless, remain a violation of the antitrust regulations.76
However, the courts now blur what once was a brightline rule.77  As
such, the plaintiff must show: "(1) the tying and tied goods are two sepa-
rate products; (2) the defendant has market power in the tying product
market; (3) the defendant affords consumers no choice but to purchase
the tied product from it; and (4) the tying arrangement forecloses a sub-
stantial volume of commerce. '78 When these elements are not satisfied,
the court will still apply the "rule of reason" if the plaintiff can demon-
strate that the seller unreasonably restrained competition in the tied mar-
ket.79  The "rule of reason," initially understood as a totality of the
circumstances test,8" is now defined as:
"The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."...
[Tihe purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the compet-
itive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a policy
favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of the
members of an industry. Subject to exceptions defined by statute,
that policy decision has been made by the Congress.81
Considering limitations on the "faux"82 per se rule and the implica-
tion of the "rule of reason," courts are unable to apply precisely any
tying rule because the tests require difficult economic analysis and deter-
minations.83 Moreover, Microsoft argued that Jefferson Parish is inap-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 22. In a dispute between an anesthesiologist and a hospital, the court ruled that the
exclusive contract for services between an anesthesiologist organization and the hospital did not
violate the per se rule of tying. The court further held that there was insufficient evidence to find
a negative impact on competition.
77. See generally id. (The Jefferson Parish court seems to limit the group of tie-in cases that
retain the per se rule to those sellers that exhibit anticompetitve forcing). See, e.g., Stephan V.
Bomse, Tying 1994: Kodak begins to Develop, 847 PLI/Corp 745, 752 (1994).
78. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 85 (citing Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Serv., Inc.,
504 U.S. 451, 461-62, (1992)), Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 12-18).
79. Id.
80. Compare id. (Justice O'Connor discussed the benefits of tying in upholding tying as a
restraint on trade against four dissenting Justices' argument to eliminate the per se tying rule) with
Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978).
81. Nat'l Soc. of Prof'l Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691-92 (quoting Bd. of Trade of City of
Chicago, 246 U.S. at 238).
82. Use of "faux" indicates that what was once a brightline rule against tying because of the
presumption that such an arrangement was anticompetitive now seemingly is the threshold inquiry
for the rule of reason analysis.
83. See generally Needham, supra note 55; Boyer, supra note 55. As an example of the
difficulty of analysis, see Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462 ("[Tying] violates § I of the
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posite because the Jefferson Parish test takes into consideration
economies arising out of bundling84 products.8 5
Bear in mind, however, "[t]he dangers to come from this exercise
of power are in the future and may never come, while the wrongs which
it is intended to remedy are here present and pressing ... "86 Notwith-
standing these comments made at the time of the Sherman Act's crea-
tion, the inquiry today seemingly changed to a balancing test that weighs
the harm to consumers against the anticompetitive behavior despite the
fact that the test does not expressly provide for such a standard.87 For an
example of this balancing, one need only to look to the Microsoft court's
express avoidance of the per se rule88 and, arguably, its torturing of the
"rule of reason" analysis described in Jefferson Parish.89
Given the standards expressed by the courts since Jefferson Parish,
the inquiry first seeks to determine if there are two distinct products and
then whether they are tied.9" To confuse matters further, because there
Sherman Act if the seller has 'appreciable economic power' in the tying product market and...
affects a substantial volume of commerce in the tied market.").
84. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 479; Data Gen. Corp. v. Digidyne Corp., 473
U.S. 908, 909 (1985); Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3d 799, 812 (D.C. Cir.
2001). Bundling is the connection of two products that yield benefits to the end user. The
benefits could be the ease of licensing as found in software/hardware products or the connection
between servicing and the product being serviced.
85. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 46-50.
86. 20 CONG. REC. S3445 at 1457 (1899), reprinted in IRVING J. SLOAN, 3 AMERICAN
LANDMARK LEGISLATION 33 (1976) (representing the statements of Sen. Jones) (discussing the
purpose for enacting the Sherman Act provisions but seeming particularly applicable to the high-
tech market).
87. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 89. "[O]bviously, we do not find that Microsoft's
integration is welfare-enhancing or that it should be absolved of tying liability." This Comment
references the harm to consumers because it is arguably true that harm to competition is equally
harmful to consumers. In addition, Microsoft seemingly relies upon the "welfare-enhancing"
effects of what was traditionally a violation of antitrust.
88. The court states that the lack of judicial experience in these types of "bundling" gives an
insufficient basis to determine that the .'pernicious effect on competition and lack of any
redeeming virtue"' require in-depth analysis to determine the nature of the harm or the reason for
the bundle. Id. at 90 (quoting N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
"Microsoft's implicit argument-that in this case looking to a competitive fringe is
inadequate to evaluate fully its potentially innovative technological integration, that such a
comparison is between apples and oranges-poses a legitimate objection to the operation of
Jefferson Parish's separate-products test for the per se rule." Id. at 89.
89. For instance, consider Justice O'Connor's statement in her Jefferson Parish concurrence:
The examination of the economic advantages of tying may properly be conducted as
part of the rule-of-reason analysis, rather than at the threshold of the tying inquiry.
This approach is consistent with this Court's occasional references to the problem.
The Court has not heretofore had occasion to set forth any general criteria for
determining when two apparently separate products are components of a single
product for tying analysis.
466 U.S. 41, n.10 (O'Connor, J., concurring)..
90. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 462 (1992).
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
are two physical products, the judgment that the two are one depends on
whether they are "officially" tied products.91 However, the need for
determining whether there are two separate products may not be impor-
tant.92 Thus, courts may deny the existence of a tie-in despite the fact
that the products may very well involve a tying arrangement that could
negatively affect competition. A more difficult, but telling, test is to
determine independent demand for the product being tied (i.e., the test
used in Jefferson Parish).93
When products are tied, the court should determine whether the
activity violates the Sherman Act.94 Yet, it seems that courts are willing
to excuse tying arrangements, that were presumptively anticompetitive
in earlier years as efficiency-enhancing, unless the controlling firm
exploits its market power. 95 The concern is that tying analysis will con-
tinue to trend toward including more aspects to the pro-competitive side
of the calculus - favoring efficiency enhancements - rather than
focusing on the negative effects of anticompetitive behavior. One dan-
gerous result could be that the exploitation of market power becomes
less important in determining whether competition is affected.
The exploitation of market power is difficult for a court to gauge
because the court must measure the appreciable economic power.96
Measuring that economic power requires inquiry into the relevant mar-
ket, which produces the dilemma of defining the relevant market with
the high-tech industries.97 On the other hand, the inquiry found in Jef-
ferson Parish asks whether there exists "forcing," such that consumers
91. See generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 234-36. The business economies may
dictate tying of products. For instance, it would be inefficient to restrict a firm from selling right
shoes if that firm produces left shoes, even if the firm maintains a monopoly on left shoes.
92. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 87-95. The court explained that early antitrust
cases used the term "separate products" as a "linguistic" requirement. Historically, the courts
ignored the inquiry when the products were obviously separate, and in less obvious circumstances,
courts quickly disposed of the issue.
93. Id. (rejecting the Jefferson Parrish test for high-technology markets); contra Jefferson
Parrish, 466 U.S. at 23 (1982). "No tying arrangement can exist unless there is sufficient demand
for the purchase of [the tied product] separate from the tying product to identify a distinct product
market in which it is efficient to offer [the tied product] separately from [the tying product]."
94. Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 33; accord Eastman Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462.
Notably, the usual doctrinal environment for tying analysis is the Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27.
95. James W. Meehan, Jr. & Robert J. Lamer, The Structural School, its Critics, and its
Progeny: An Assessment, in ECONOMICS & ANTITRUST POLICY 195 (Robert J. Lamer & James W.
Meehan, Jr. eds., 1989).
96. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. 464. The Court, citing varied cases, describes
appreciable economic power as the power to compel a buyer to behave differently than a buyer in
a competitive market, to increase price and restrict output, and demonstrated through control of a
"predominant share of the market."
97. See id. at 465-466 (defining the derivative aftermarket as separate from the primary
market); see also James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and
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make decisions they would not otherwise make.98 If there is no forcing,
there is no harm99 - unless, as this Comment suggests the reality to be
that when the court analyzes the markets, it determines that the forcing
is less harmful than the efficiency gains.
The difficulty with the buyer's choice analysis is that by using the
availability of substitutes to define the market, the result may be a mar-
ket too broadly defined because the test does not differentiate why buy-
ers make their decisions.'00 For instance, a buyer's choice does not
include some of the factors considered in elasticity analysis.' 0 ' Other
criticisms rest on the fact that products or services are fundamentally
different in "appearance, quality, reliability, service, technical assis-
tance, and ease of shipment, warranty, and many other factors that buy-
ers consider important."'0 2 Therefore, arguably, tying would only arise
when the products or services are indistinguishable, which is likely
never the case, unless the products or services are commodities.
Ultimately, Microsoft's argument that the benefits to consumers
should control the tying inquiry is belied by the fact that these tests are
unable to "reveal anything meaningful concerning resource allocation
and [social] welfare."' 013 Regardless of market definition and how it
relates to tying, anticompetitive behavior is the ultimate concern of the
drafters of the Sherman Act.'" 4 Furthermore, the relevant market
inquiry, often difficult for courts to assess, is ultimately a determination
for the fact-finder. '0 5
It follows that the threshold legal question should be whether the
activity is anticompetitive - arguably, aligning better with the intent of
High-Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 247, 258 (1995); but see Werden, supra note 39
(discussing the lack of judicial experience with the technology).
Economic power analysis is, perhaps, easier in tying analysis than in other antitrust analysis
because the court will focus on what alternatives are available to consumers.
98. See Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 29.
99. Id.
100. Dominick T. Armentano, Competition Theory and the Market Economy, in A CENTURY
OF THE SHERMAN AcT: AMERICAN ECONOMIC OPINION, 1890-1990 224 (Jack C. High & Wayne E.
Gable, eds., 1992).
101. See supra text accompanying note 55.
102. See Armentano, supra note 100, at 224.
103. Id. at 225.
104. IRVING J. SLOAN, 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION 8 (1976) ("President Cleveland,
in his annual message to Congress at the end of 1887, said it was 'notorious' that the
'combinations quite prevalent at this time, and frequently called trusts,' strangled competition; he
urged that action be taken against them...").
105. Courts will be presented with expert economic testimony that the finder of fact must
interpret and decide. Such expert testimony will be subject to judicial gate keeping provided for
by the rules of evidence. This inquiry is better suited for the courts than economic theory and is
not fully addressed here.
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the framers.10 6 Instead of these tests, there could be a determination of
the extent of the anticompetitiveness; thereby avoiding a fact-finder's
attempt to use difficult economic analysis (either the jury or a judge).
For example, although never actually a test, the courts' initial response
to the Sherman Act was to look at the combination for a tendency
toward monopoly and a loss of the benefits10 7 that attach to a free
market."08
This Comment suggests that, at a minimum, the Jefferson Parish
test, or perhaps earlier per se analyses, should prevail, whereby courts
must look at the effect on competition as a way to protect the long-term
losses of "innovations that improve quality of future products" arising
from lost competition.0 9 Otherwise, the current trend of tying analysis
seems to be leading toward an inquiry as to whether the consumer wel-
fare and societal gains are sufficient enough for the court to disregard
companies' anticompetitive behavior. Rather, the inquiry into the bal-
ance between economic (or arguably societal) benefits and the negative
impact of competition in high-technology markets does not belong in
judicial antitrust analysis because there may always be benefits to justify
such violations.
Indeed, Robin Hood is guilty of theft. Whether he is performing
his theft under the guise of providing for the poor does not change the
illegality of his acts. The illegality and serving-the-poor inquiries are
separate and should stay that way. It seems that the antitrust analysis
combined with the tying inquiry has become too inclusive.
106. 20 CONG. REC. 1167-69 at 1168 (1889), reprinted in SLOAN, supra note 1. (Senator
Sherman states that sections subsequent to Article I aim to "protect a weak person from being
compelled by surrounding circumstances..." This strongly suggests that the legislators wanted
to ensure protections from what contemporarily sounds like tying arrangements.).
107. See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427 ("[m]any people believe that possession of
unchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that
immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the
spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough
alone.").
108. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16 (1895). The Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sherman Act but affirmed the lower court's decision denying relief to the
plaintiff.
109. See Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Competition, Innovation, and Antitrust Enforcement in Dynamic
Network Industries, Address Before Software Publishers Association (Mar. 24, 1998), at 1998
WL 1769814 at *14.
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C. Network Effects 1'0 and Barriers to Entry'
Under the concept of tying, illegal arrangements can occur when a
company with market power also has a product with strong network
effects. 11 2 Simply put, network effects are the benefit to the consumer
arising from the widespread use of the same product. 1 3 The high-tech-
nology network effects arise "because the increased ...development
will enhance the value of the particular [product] and therefore increase
its demand." ' 4 To take advantage of this consequence, firms could cre-
ate barriers to entry for producers and increase "switching costs" to con-
sumers." 5  Overall, network effects are value-producing benefits that
I 10. In Microsoft, the court dealt with this principle, to which it stated:
We decide this case against a backdrop of significant debate amongst academics and
practitioners over the extent to which "old economy" § 2 monopolization doctrines
should apply to firms competing in dynamic technological markets characterized by
network effects. In markets characterized by network effects, one product or
standard tends towards dominance, because "the utility that a user derives from
consumption of the good increases with the number of other agents consuming the
good."
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 49 (D.C. Cir 2001) (quoting Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 Am. ECON. REV. 424,
424 (1985)).
111. "[M]onopoly power may be inferred from a firm's possession of a dominant share of a
relevant market that is protected by entry barriers." Id. at 5 1.
112. See, e.g., id. at 83-87.
113. See generally LEIBowrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 2. The entire book seems to involve
the value added by the combined use of a product. The authors do recognize that the value may
be greater with other products. This is done through discussions about, inter alia, VHS videotapes
inferiority versus Beta format videotapes.
114. See Rubinfeld, supra note 109, at 1.
For example, there are several providers of Instant Messaging service, including
Microsoft, AOL, and Yahoo!. Ceteris paribus, interconnecting these systems would
almost surely raise the value of each system to its customers, and this strongly
suggests that these messaging systems are in the same market .... [Clustomers of
wireless telephones benefit greatly from being able to send and receive calls to and
from customers of traditional wireline telephones, suggesting strong network
effects.
Gerald R. Faulhaber, ACCESS ? ACCESS, + ACCESS2 , 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L.
677, 691 (2002).
On the other hand, in the Microsoft situation, there are few developers that would be able to
exist if not for the fact that those developers align their products with Windows. To accomplish
that, obviously, they would need to know the Windows programming. Consequently, Microsoft
can control the developers because of the strong network effects in that market. See, e.g., Werden,
supra note 39, at 101 (to "challenge an incumbent benefiting from significant indirect network
effects, an entrant would have to enlist and coordinate complementer support, a process to which
Microsoft applies the term 'evangelization.' ").
115. Cf Victoria E. Brieant & Paul S. Smitberger, Information Costs, Lifecycle Costs,
Switching Costs, and Lock-In, SF37 ALI-ABA.L.I.-A.B.A. 7 (2000)) (discussing the implications
of network effects arising form market power on the competitive forces).
"Switching costs" are perhaps the single most important factor in determining whether a
customer is "locked-in," or may migrate to another computer system to avoid the increased cost.
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could lead to an abuse of market power that may develop into a restric-
tion on competition." 16
Of the many interpretations, three views on barriers to entry cover
the spectrum.'' 7  The first view concerns "whether (long-run) price
exceeds (long-run) average cost after entry has ceased."' 1 8 Adding to
this definition is the second notion, recognizing that the firm is able to
"set prices above marginal cost,"' 19 which appears more like a recogni-
tion that monopoly power exists.' 2° Both of these definitions conceive
of economies of scale as a barrier to entry.' 2' Finally, a more simple
understanding is the third view that the only barriers to entry are those
costs new entrants face but incumbents avoid.1 22  Common to all of
these interpretations is the inquiry into differences between what insid-
ers and outsiders face.' 23 Regardless of the meaning, significant barriers
to entry clearly provide fertile ground for the incumbent to control pric-
ing (i.e., monopoly power).' 24
Each interpretation rightly suggests that there are serious considera-
tions for a prospective producer to contemplate before entering the mar-
ket.'2 5  Some commentators suggest that a firm commencing product
There are substantial costs associated with migration. Although many companies discuss
migration, as a percentage, relatively few have actually completed a migration to another
platform.
For example, for minicomputers, migration costs can include, without limitation, the
following categories: fees for consultants to determine the appropriate replacement for the existing
computer system; costs for conversion of existing applications software or a new applications
software package; training of personnel on the new hardware; and risks of loss of data in
conversions from the old system to the new system.
Id. at 16. See also LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 132-33.
116. Cf Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 50; earlier cases do not discuss network effects but the
arguments are nonetheless consistent with the understanding of network effects. See Eastman
Kodak Co., 504 U.S. at 462; Jefferson Parrish, 466 U.S. at 23; EC. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 16.
117. See generally Harold Demsetz, Barriers to Entry, in A CENTURY OF THE SHERMAN ACT
155 (Jack C. High & Wayne E. Gable eds., 1992).
118. Id. at 156 (a simplification of Joe Bain's definition).
119. Id. (James Furguson's understanding of barriers to entry).
120. See supra text accompanying note 23.
121. See Demsetz, supra note 117.
122. Id. (George Stigler's definition of barrier to entry).
123. Id. at 156-57.
124. See supra text accompanying note 23. In fact, the court in Microsoft reiterated the
predominance of Windows market share:
Having thus properly defined the relevant market, the District Court found that
Windows accounts for a greater than 95% share. The court also found that even if
Mac OS were included, Microsoft's share would exceed 80% .... Microsoft
challenges neither finding, nor does it argue that such a market share is not
predominant (internal citations omitted)
Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 54.
125. See Werden, supra note 39, at 90. The Werden article discusses three broad approaches
to defining "barriers to entry." The Stigler definition considers those costs a new entrant must
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development faces the characteristic of the high-technology industry:
high cost to initiate production, and only then, low-variable costs to pro-
duce the product.' 26  This implies that the high-technology market has
within it an already existing barrier to entry. 27  As a result of this
dynamic, and whether one defines such circumstances as a barrier to
entry, when there are sufficient network effects the increased financial
pressure on new entrants as well as the higher switching costs to con-
sumers create an enormous advantage to the incumbent. 128
For example, consider again the case of the VHS videotape format.
Putting aside the circumstances surrounding the demise of the Beta for-
mat, digital video media have tried to supplant the VHS video. Even
before the advent of the digital video disc ("DVD"), there was the video
disc. That format failed partly because the consumer would have to
purchase new equipment (e.g., network effects and switching costs) to
enjoy the pre-DVD video disc's benefits. Now, however, perhaps due to
the increase in personal computers or other compact disc ("CD") formats
(i.e., CD, CD-ROM, CD-R), DVDs seem destined to overtake VHS
video in much the same way that the CD replaced vinyl records."2 9
The phenomenon of network effects is particularly applicable to the
high-technology industry. 130 One such application is the corresponding
connection between the primary product and the complementary prod-
uct, understood as "indirect network effects," which in some cases gives
rise to a tying arrangement.' 3' Although not recognized by the courts,
incur, which the incumbent can avoid; whereas the Bain description includes "absolute cost
advantages," "product differentiation," and "economies of scale." In conjunction with these
theories, the traditional economic writing contemplates the sunk costs (investment irretrievable to
the incumbent upon exit) as a way to identify barriers to entry.
126. See Pitofsky, supra note 14. To begin production, a firm must invest enough funds to
develop the product. After the initial investment, the continued production is sustained with low
variable costs.
Simply stated, the cost to create a computer application is high but the reproduction is
relatively inexpensive per unit.
127. See supra text accompanying note 117. See also Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 82
("Because a firm cannot possess monopoly power in a market unless that market is also protected
by significant barriers to entry, ... it follows that a firm cannot threaten to achieve monopoly
power in a market unless that market is, or will be, similarly protected.")
128. See generally Thomas A. Piraino Jr., An Antitrust Remedy or Monopoly Leveraging by
Electronic Networks, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 15-18 (1998); see also Richard J. Gilbert, Networks,
Standards, and the Use of Market Dominance, in THE AMERICAN ANnTRUST REVOLUTION 411
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. and& Lawrence J. White eds., 1999).
Switching costs are not only money, but also the perceived loss of benefits a consumer will
realize if they were to change to a different product because of the decreased network.
129. Video Disc was an awkward format because of its size, yet it seemed to be approximately
the same size and appearance as vinyl records.
130. Pitofsky, supra note 14.
131. "[T]he § I tying claim, plaintiffs will be precluded from arguing any theory of harm that
depends on a precise definition of browsers or barriers to entry (for example, network effects from
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indirect network effects
arise not directly from increases in the size of the network, but from
the effect a larger network has on the production of complements.
Increased sales of compact disc players stimulated the production of
compact discs, which further increased demand for compact disc
players. Economists have cited indirect network effects as a major
factor in Microsoft's displacement of what had been the leading PC
operating system. '32
The proponents of permitting such anticompetitive activity often frame
the problem as beneficial to both consumers and producers. Standardi-
zation, the compatibility of products for the benefit of network effects,
naturally selecting 133 the best technology, provides proponents of differ-
ent antitrust standards with a justification for permitting anticompetitive
behavior. 131
In many cases, these complementary products or services are neces-
sarily produced by the primary product producer to facilitate the smooth
interactions between the primary and secondary products and ser-
vices.135 Predictably, one conclusion is that the consumer's benefits
Internet protocols and extensions embedded in a browser) other than what may be implicit in
Microsoft's tying arrangement." Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 95. The incorporation of tying also
concerns the barriers to entry. See id. Furthermore, "to the extent that certain aspects of tying
injury may depend on a careful definition of the tied good market and a showing of barriers to
entry other than the tying arrangement itself, plaintiffs would have to establish these points." ld;
accord Werden, supra note 39, at 90. In discussing indirect network effects, the author described
what actually appears to be a tying analysis.
132. Werden, supra note 39, at 90.
Fax machines are a market exhibiting direct network effects but not declining
average costs. A fax machine is more valuable to me as I can exchange faxes with
more people, but the supply function has never been considered a natural monopoly.
Similarly, VCRs are a market exhibiting indirect network effects-the value of a
machine depends in large part on the variety of prerecorded movies in a compatible
format. But VCRs are also not natural monopoly goods.
James B. Speta, Tying, Essential Facilities, and Network Externalities: A Comment on Piraino, 93
NW. U. L. REV. 1277, 1279 n.II (1999).
The utility of a particular make of car is enhanced by the number of people who
own that make of car because that will sustain a larger service network, making it
more likely that each owner will be able quickly and easily to obtain service as
needed. It is the inability to maintain an adequate dealer and service network that
has led some successful European automakers, such as Peugeot, to cease selling cars
in the United States.
William J. Kolasky, Network Effects: a Contrarian View, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 577, 585-86
(1999).
133. But see generally LEIBOwITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2. The market problem of
selecting VHS tapes over the superior Beta format and QWERTY-style keyboard over the
superior DVORAK keyboard illustrates how the market manipulations create the selection of an
inferior product.
134. James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Standard-Setting Consortia, Antitrust, and High-
Technology Industries, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. at 259 (1995).
135. See Piraino, supra note 128, at 15.
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gained outweigh the market's loss of competition. 136  However, this
leaves the long-term effect on innovation, borne from competition, a
heavily debated topic. 137
On the other hand, it is widely believed that high-technology mar-
kets are easy to enter because innovative developments are quick to
occur. 138 Under this view, the speed of innovation creates a monopoly
that is not sustainable. 139 One assumption is that superior products will
quickly develop and the inventors will market the innovations before
competitors imitate the product. Innovation, thereby, creates successive
product improvements that replace obsolescence, thus forming a "serial
monopoly" for each subsequent producer. 40
Some authorities suggest that because of the speed of innovation,
there is no need for antitrust laws; the important returns to entrepreneurs
for innovation have a short duration, which gives rise to the concept of
serial monopoly.' 4 ' Companies are able to secure additional profit pro-
tection for innovation through the use of the statutory monopoly power
of patents and copyright laws. 4 ' Alternatively, the length of protection
for innovation through copyright and patent seems longer (lately, indefi-
nite since Congress easily extends the limitation period, suggesting that
there might be less concern over monopoly)' 43 than the time a firm con-
trols a market under the serial monopoly theory. Therefore, antitrust
laws should apply to those firms with market power that persist after the
136. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 2.
137. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 423-24; see also Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 2. The
competitive nature of the market that gave rise to the technology at issue and built the monopoly
could reasonably chill future innovation.
138. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 3. See also David A. Balto & James F. Mongoven, Antitrust
Remedies in High Technology Industries, 708 PLI/Pat 113, 115 (2002); Charles E. Biggio,
Handling Mergers & Acquisitions in a High-Tech and Emerging Growth Environment-Antitrust
and Your Deal, 985 PLI/Corp 599, 603 (1997); Matthew Fagin, Frank Pasquale & Kim
Weatherall, Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and Enhance Online Music
Distribution, 8 B.U. J. ScL & TECH. L. 451, 534-35 (2002); John H. Barton, Antitrust Treatment
of Oligopolies with Mutually Blocking Patent Portfolios 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 851, 865 (2002);
Carol B. Swanson, Antitrust Excitement in the New Millennium: Microsoft, Mergers, And More,
54 OKLA. L. REV. 285, 305 (2001); Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at
the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, 68 ANrIRusT L.J. 913, 916 (2001); but see
Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology Competition, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 65, 76-77 (2002) ("In mature high technology markets, however, antitrust
enforcers should be more willing to intervene to prevent dominant firms from using their market
power to raise already substantial entry barriers.").
139. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 3.
140. See LEIBowrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 136-37.
141. Cf Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 3.
142. Id.
143. This analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment and, therefore, not fully addressed
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legal protections normally would run out.'4 4
The result of network effects and barriers to entry is that incumbent
companies are able to take advantage of higher switching costs. Yet, as
discussed earlier with the previous antitrust analyses, there seems to be a
dilution of the network effects and barriers analyses. On that point, the
dilution occurs because of the increased attention to efficiency gains and
decreased attention to loss of innovation arising from anticompetitive
activity that may, over the long run, return efficiency losses. If so, there
is some acceptance of the anticompetitive activity. That acceptance pos-
sibly relies on the distinction between those "activities [that are] socially
desirable and [those] which are not."' 45
D. Monopoly and Predation:
Predation analysis, if for no other reason than the connotations
associated with predation, should be clear of any balancing between
what are arguably societal benefits and anticompetitive losses. The pri-
mary question for determining predation in pricing is whether a com-
pany is selling its product below either marginal cost or average variable
cost. 146 Notably, this rule as usually employed is hard to apply to intel-
lectual property markets, like software, because the reproduction costs
are de minimus.'47
However, predation may still exist because "[p]redatory pricing is
144. But cf id. See also LEIBOWrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 10-11, 16, 136-37, 202, 267.
For example, "[s]tandard setting, often under the auspices of a trade association, can facilitate
innovation." Janice M. Mueller, Symposium, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry
Standards, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 623, 630 (2002). Furthermore,
the New Economy that distinguish it from traditional markets and place new
demands on antitrust enforcement. First, because the initial costs of research and
development of a product are particularly high and the variable costs relatively low,
providing incentives to innovate, such as the limited monopoly right of a patent, is
especially important. On the other hand, the importance of innovation necessitates
preserving competition at the research and development stage. Finally, the dynamic
nature of high technology, as contrasted with other industries, makes it more
difficult for any one firm to dominate a particular market share. The
unpredictability of how these and other factors drive the New Economy places new
demands on antitrust enforcement officials. Consequently, antitrust enforcement
must take special care to ensure that the right balance of competition and protection
of innovation is maintained.
Lara J. Glasgow & Alicia N. Vaz, Symposium, Foreword: Beyond Microsoft: Antitrust,
Technology, and Intellectual Property, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 525, 527 (2001).
145. See Demsetz, supra note 117, at 168.
146. The two-part test is whether the price is less than the cost of the good and the likelihood
that the company selling below cost is able to recuperate the losses over the long run. See
generally Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). See
generally HOVENKAMP, supra note 45, at 173-75. The initial inquiry depends upon marginal cost
but because of measuring difficulty, average variable cost is a frequently used surrogate.
147. Once a program is created, there is very little cost involved with mass-producing
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not the only possible predatory strategy that a firm may use in trying to
eliminate current competition or deter future competition."' 48 A sug-
gested alternative is to determine whether the firm is maximizing profits
in light of the competitors' continued existence in the market.' 49 For
instance, a firm that is continually creating products or services without
regard to efficiency may be acting predaciously. One such example is
when an organization acquires a company that is developing a competi-
tive product, to prevent competition with the acquiring company's
existing product because that competitive product might interfere with
established network effects.
Critics suggest that such a test would fail to consider the social
welfare gains derived from the tie-in, network, or complementary prod-
ucts.150 Hypothetically, it is possible that such a test for predatory prac-
tices would decrease innovation or efficiency by precluding the creation
of marketable products or services. Moreover, that test's implication is
that there would be no incentive to gain economies of scale if the quest
could lead to an antitrust violation. Yet, as seen in Jefferson Parish,
when social loss is not part of the calculus for tying arrangements, it
would seem likely that predation analysis similarly would not account
for social loss stemming from stunted innovation.' 5 1 Perhaps both con-
cepts are too speculative and, therefore, do not belong in the calculus.
152
Generally, the courts recognize that the government should not
defeat a company that competes and wins, provided the achievement
does not occur during an attempt to monopolize.' 53 The distinction
between aggressive competitiveness and attempting to monopolize is at
least as difficult as the previous analyses. Yet, that distinction may
implicate long-term inefficiencies that may surface when government
intervention hinders a firm's innovation in the quest to control through
exclusionary or predatory behavior. 154  Accordingly, exclusionary or
predatory behavior, as used herein, means "the willful acquisition or
maintenance of that power as distinguished from growth or development
as a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic
duplicates. In fact, some software, if not all, is available on the Internet. Thus, reproduction costs
are negligible.
148. See Rubinfeld, supra note 109, at 5
149. Cf Joseph Gregory Sidak, Debunking Predatory Innovation, 83 COLtJM. L. REV. 1121,
1124 (1983). The Ordover and Willig analysis seeks to determine if the firm has sacrificed profits
by looking at the post innovation pricing and the research and development investment decision.
150. Id. at 1126.
151. But cf. LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2.
152. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 45.
153. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuinlan, 506 U.S. 447, 809-91 (1993). See also Piriano,
supra note 128, at 22 (quoting Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416).
154. See Rubinfeld, supra note 109, at 8.
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accident." 155
Inasmuch as the court uses various terms to describe disfavored
behavior, and each one has distinct elements bound up in its interpreta-
tion, for the purposes of this Comment "anticompetitive," "exclusion-
ary," and "predatory ' 5 are used only to indicate the specific disfavored
conduct of a company.' 57 Only those organizations that act poorly in the
context of competition should be subject to prosecution. Inadvertent
aggregation of market power, without more, should consequently come
under the civil enforcement realm rather than governmental prosecution.
Therefore, regardless of the term used, intent (important for this distinc-
tion) exists when monopolizing, because in order to monopolize, the
firm must be cognizant of its actions. 5 8 Understanding these terms
leads to the simple test for determining whether there exists a violation
of section 2 of the Sherman Act: "(1) the defendant engaged in predatory
or exclusionary conduct, (2) the defendant had a specific intent to
monopolize, and (3) there was a dangerous probability that the defen-
dant would successfully attain monopoly power."'' 5 9
To apply the third prong of the test, there must be an inquiry into
market power, which is a fact question dependent on "proximity and
degree."' 160 Consider, after all, that accompanying the monopoly test is
the view that excluding competitors on "some other basis than effi-
ciency" is a predatory practice.16' This view is important to the antitrust
analysis of the high-tech market because the "carve-out" for efficiency
seems to provide an excuse for predatory practices. For instance, there
is likely a valid efficiency justification for the practices of monopolistic
companies, as seen in Microsoft's argument (i.e. "pro-competitive justi-
fication"). 162 While some may argue that consumer benefit is the over-
arching principle behind the antitrust doctrine, it is not the short-term
benefits that are at stake, but rather the long-term losses unknowable at
the time of the wrongful conduct.
Consequently, predatory or exclusionary behavior is understood
155. U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). See also Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d
at 58 ("We shall see that this ... ingredient presents no major problem here, as what was done in
building the empire was done plainly and explicitly for a single purpose [ - monopolization].").
156. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 602 (1985).
157. The independent meaning attached to these terms and the associated analysis is beyond
the scope of this Comment. The only use of these concepts intended is to point out the types of
behavior that give rise to the negative effects in high tech markets.
158. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 603.
159. Taylor Publishing Co. v. Jostens, Inc., 216 F.3d 465, 474 (5th Cir. 2000).
160. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 80 (quoting United States v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d
1114, 1118 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 402 (1905)).
161. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605.
162. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 59.
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most broadly as diminishing the "opportunity [for] rivals" and narrowly
defined as either "not further[ing] competition on the merits or do[ing]
so in an unnecessarily restrictive way."' 163 In any case, the judicial anal-
ysis includes the balancing of efficiency against anticompetitive behav-
ior, which weakens the likelihood of finding predation. A problem
arises, however, because this represents a departure from what seems to
be the Sherman Act's intent.
As such, it seems that interpreting predation via efficiency is
counterintuitive because efficiency is an economic benefit that has a
return to society, and theoretically, the consumer benefits from all effi-
ciency gains. This reasoning defeats the anticompetitive side of the
equation, as the high-tech company can usually show that the net effi-
ciency benefits to both the company and the market outweigh the net
harm to consumers. Therein lies the paradox: agreeing with high-tech
companies regarding the benefits to the market and consumer means that
predatory behavior also benefits the public. Yet, there is a significant
long-term effect on the market despite the fact that the net harm is insuf-
ficient under current judicial inquiry. All thieves would argue that they
have Robin Hood qualities.
E. Finding and Hitting a Moving Target:
The speed of change within the high-tech market, in conjunction
with the fact-finding in the adversarial process, makes prosecuting anti-
trust cases arduous and lengthy.' 64 The most well known example of
this is
the debacle when the U.S. Government brought a monopolization
case against IBM, representing at the time the cutting edge of high-
tech innovation .... After seven years of discovery and six years of
trial, including a trial presentation that covered 104,000 pages of tran-
script, the Government in 1982 dismissed the case - almost cer-
tainly correctly - on grounds, among others, that by that time IBM
was no longer a monopolist.165
Most of the antitrust cases involving high-technology require compli-
cated analysis, 166 as well as interpretation of intricate, highly technical
information about the products and harm to competition167 - all of
which adds to the time needed to prosecute Sherman Act violators.
Consider the argument that antitrust law is irrelevant to the high-
163. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 605.
164. See Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 11.
165. Id. at 10.
166. See Part II, supra.
167. See Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 11.
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tech markets.'68 Indeed, the speed of changes in technology tends to
diminish the deterrent effect of prosecuting antitrust violators because
the monopolist is gone before the completion of the case.169 On the
other hand, if that is true, then another paradox arises: What is the rea-
son for Microsoft's continued dominance given the speed of change in
the industry? Under such a theory, Microsoft should not be able to mus-
ter such power because its monopolistic power derives from technology
that quickly becomes obsolete.
This constantly changing and complicated web of technology and
science results in disadvantages for the legal system.17 0 As a result of
this dynamic, it is imperative that all interested parties keep abreast of
technology within the market and anticipate advances, as well as keep
up with the firm's innovation. 7 ' That is not to say that each of these
parties must continually monitor high-tech companies. Rather, as is per-
haps the case with all specialties, those who are continually involved
should maintain that expertise. Nonetheless, with continued exposure,
lawyers and judges will be able to operate within this complicated indus-
try.72 The widely accepted notion that the monopoly will self-dis-
integrate, notwithstanding the slowness of the judiciary, again seems
less convincing in light of Microsoft's longevity. 73
What is certain to this author is that prosecuting high-tech compa-
nies under the Sherman Act is proper. While the entire process may be
slow, not properly enforcing the Sherman Act is an alternative that
allows anticompetitive acts to go unchecked. Seemingly more valuable
is a legitimate authority to ensure the protection of competition. Upon
return of the king, Robin Hood fell silent.
F. Why the Sherman Act?
Despite all of the inadequacies of the legal system, the Sherman
Act is precisely the right tool in place to deal with restraint of trade in
the high-tech arena.' 7 4 The original statute has undergone substantial
168. See generally LEIBOWITZ & MARGOLIs, supra note 2.
169. Id.
170. See generally Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (the discussion in the opinion describes the
situation in what appears to be another language but is actually a series of acronyms); see also
Appellant's Brief at 18-32. Microsoft used all of these pages to describe, in a glossary, the terms
it was going to use, indicating the complexity of the market. See Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 11.
171. See Rubinfeld, supra note 109, at 9
172. Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 11.
173. In light of all of the arguments against Microsoft being able to sustain market power and
defeat competition, the firm does exactly that.
174. See Rubinfeld, supra note 109, at 1. Many of the other authorities, some of which this
Comment cites, suggest that there is no place for antitrust regulation within the high technology
market.
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interpretive change over the years, resulting in balancing tests between
the benefits of anticompetitive behavior and the losses associated with
restraint of trade. Therefore, high-tech antitrust regulation may be
diluted (or continue to be diluted, depending on your point of view)
because the current interpretive trend seemingly seeks to shelter
anticompetitive companies based on what could be defined as delivery
of societal or public benefits.
Instead, there should be some discretion. For instance, either the
courts or the government (or both) could perform an analysis of the soci-
etal gain resulting from the alleged monopolist's overall activity before
prosecuting the company. This raises the question of how to discrimi-
nate between antitrust violations that ought to be prosecuted, while
simultaneously avoiding the introduction of negative bias. In other
words, how does the public separate the do-gooders and the thieves?
III. DISCRETIONARY PROSECUTION: FOR REAL
At the inception of the Sherman Act, the Republican administration
refrained from prosecuting the trusts, 75 possibly because the potential
defendants contributed substantially to the presidential campaign.1 76 In
light of the statute's slow initiation, one reason could be that trusts might
not be able to contribute to the political party without the benefit of
extraordinary profits. 7 7 Enforcing the new law would take away the
"monopoly profits" trusts had at their disposal, thus leaving little for
contributions. 78 From its enactment through today, the Sherman Act's
application continually depended on either the governmental prosecution
or an individual's claim initiated by a civil suit. 179 If one focused only
on the government's discretionary prosecution, it is clear that discretion
(in principle) is not a new concept. 180
Even if the government does not prosecute an antitrust case, busi-
175. A trust, as used here, is a combination of large companies within an industry that agree to
conduct various anticompetitive activities.
176. Section 256, Act of Feb. 28, 1925, ch. 368, title III, § 301, 43 Stat. 1070, provided for
citation of the act as the "Federal Corrupt Practices Act."
Currently, the Coercion of Political Activity statute provides a similar restriction to those
enacted in 1925. 18 U.S.C. § 610 (2000).
See also Why Not Begin in Ohio, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1891 at 4.
177. Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly: Economic Analysis, Legal
Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 628 (1999).
178. See Why Not Begin in Ohio, supra note 176. Notably, this is true of any business
regulation.
179. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
180. Consider the different levels of prosecution over the years. See WILLIAM F. SHURGART II,
ANTITRUST POLICY AND INTEREST-GROUP POLITICS 83-92, 130-32 (William F. Shurgart II ed.,
1990).
For example, one only has to look to the debates between the "antitrusters" and the
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nesses are not without a tool to fight companies with pervasive market
power; there remains the civil cause of action for those firms that find
themselves falling victim to anticompetitive assaults. Additionally, as
mentioned earlier, the Sherman Act's emphasis is to protect competition,
not competitors. Importantly, however, the civil litigant will face the
same standards used in the federal criminal prosecution of alleged
monopolists.
In light of the statutory remedy available to businesses, a continued
disintegration of the antitrust laws and standards will create insurmount-
able hurdles for companies to protect markets victimized by monopolists
that create enough benefits to avoid liability. One of the most critical
depletions of the antitrust regulations is the judicial attempt to account
"economic planners" from the Great Depression era to see some of the same type of arguments
that exist today and, for that matter, within this Comment:
The Great Depression, however, with its mass unemployment and declining
incomes, brought a new and acute awareness of the monopoly problem, a new
consciousness of the gap between ideal and reality. Along with the concern over
centralization, injustice, and loss of individual freedom, came a new concern, a
growing belief that the misuse of business power was responsible for the economic
breakdown and the persistence of depression conditions. Reorganization and reform
of the business system, so many Americans felt, had now become an imperative
necessity; as one might expect, the approaches to the problem tended to follow the
patterns established earlier. Once again, opinion divided along lines that were
roughly similar to those which had divided the New Freedom, the New Nationalism,
and the "new competition."
Like the advocates of the New Freedom, for example, the antitrusters or neo-
Brandeisians favored a policy of decentralizing the business structure and enforcing
competitive behavior. They did so both with the idea of implementing democratic
and individualistic ideals and with a growing conviction that enforced competition
was the best way to achieve sustained prosperity. The depression, as they saw it,
was a product of monopolistic rigidities. The businessmen, because of their market
power, had been able to maintain prices even though their costs of production were
falling. This had resulted in excessive profits, oversavings, and a failure of
consumer purchasing power. And the only real solution, they felt, if such crises
were to be averted in the future, was a program that would restore flexible prices
and allow competitive forces to keep the economy in balance. They believed,
moreover, that these goals were attainable. They could be attained by rigorous
antitrust prosecution, by limits on size, by a tax on bigness, by controls over
business financing and competitive practices, and by other measures that would
encourage more reliance on free markets.
The economic planners, on the other hand, like the New Nationalists of an
earlier period, felt that antitrust action was a hopeless anachronism. In a modern
economy, they maintained, concentrations of economic power were inevitable. They
were necessary for efficient mass production, technical progress, and reasonable
security; and while the abuse of this power was largely responsible for the
depression, the idea that it could be dispersed was both impractical and dangerous.
The only real answer lay in systematic organization and planning, in conscious and
rational administrative control of economic processes so as to restore economic
balance and prevent future breakdowns.
See HAWLEY, supra note 37, at 12-13.
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for the entire economics-the social gain and benefit interwoven and
balanced with the anticompetitive activities. That is not to say the
inquiry includes such things as safety and welfare, as those terms loosely
apply to societal benefits. Rather, what is meant here is simply societal
gains arising from the market.
It seems that there is a better way to keep the Sherman Act consis-
tent with its original intent by using the balancing contortions of the
courts, applied in a slightly different way: Use the government's discre-
tion before prosecuting to weed out the antitrust violators that create
benefits for society. Instead, the discretion calculus would take into
account creation of societal benefit substantial enough to outweigh the
cost of the anticompetitive behavior when deciding whether to prosecute
a firm. Conceivably, such companies would survive an antitrust action
anyway; therefore, it would be more efficient to avoid prosecuting those
firms in the first place. This benefit, however, should not be as narrow
as what is currently used by the courts. Alternatively, the government
could inquire whether the monopolistic company invests its monopoly
profits in philanthropic 8' activity sufficiently enough to create public
benefit.
181. Philanthropic activity could be any private use of funds directed toward the public without
regard for the business dealings normally encountered in everyday operations. The donation need
not be for the benefit of the entire public, but instead could improve some sub-group of society.
An example of this type of dynamic is the contribution of computers by a software manufacturer
to impoverished public schools. Compare this type of contribution with the donation of computers
to a company that uses the software of the donor.
Contrast this dichotomy with the donation of the manufacturer's software, which would not
redistribute very much of the extreme profits realized by a company with dominant market power.
This type of grant seems to fit in the gray area between public benefit and private benefit because
the donor may reap a greater benefit through the network effects and potential path dependence
created in the donees.
There is a general definition of path dependence that seems to encompass many disciplines
but consider this notion that specifically contemplates new high technology companies:
" Origins Matter - Just as some developmental psychologists profess that "biology
is destiny," notions of organizational inertia and imprinting imply that a
company's early organization-building activities might preordain its destiny.
" Change is Disruptive - In their best-selling Built to Last, James Collins and Jerry
Porras argue that companies that have prospered over the long haul have adhered
to enduring values, which have served as guideposts for strategy and operations
over time. Of course, adherence to enduring values can also impede a company's
ability to respond effectively to dramatic environmental changes. However, the
evolutionary perspective on organizations suggests that the potential benefits of
altering a company's deeply held values and longstanding practices have to be
traded off against the significant risks that such changes often entail, in terms of
undermining internal routines and external relations that help make life
predictable and controllable.
James N. Baron & Michael T. Hannan, Organizational Blueprints for Success in High-Tech Start-
Ups: Lessons from the Stanford Project on Emerging Companies, CAL. MGMT. REV. Spring 2002
at 8, 18-19. See also LEIowrrz & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 51.
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While this unusual approach to prosecutorial decisionmaking
sounds extremely out of sorts when compared to the mainstream thought
on antitrust, consider the fact that many activities presently aiding the
public receive preferential treatment under the law. Also, there are
many companies indulging in this philanthropic activity. For example,
"IBM has committed a total of $70 million to its Reinventing Education
program, which now reaches 65,000 teachers and 6 million students."' 82
In fact, such a charitable endeavor brings with it a competitive advan-
tage in and of itself. 83
The idea is not new. There are exemptions from competitive regu-
lations where the organization provides some return to the community.
For instance, purchases by a company may be exempt from antitrust
"proscriptions" so long as they comply with the strict interpretation of
the standards applied to the exemption. 84  In fact, the Court acknowl-
edged that the creation of the exemption was "concerned with the suspi-
cion [the regulation] .. .actually might operate to outlaw price favors
that sellers would wish to grant to eleemosynary institutions."' 85 Here
comes Robin Hood; perhaps the best way to account for the good inten-
tions of the thief is by determining his selflessness.
182. Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage of Corporate
Philanthropy, HARV. Bus. J., Dec. 2002 at 5, 14.
183. For a complete discussion on the competitiveness of philanthropy, see generally, id. For
example, the strategy is easily discerned by common business analysis:
When corporations support the right causes in the right ways - when they get the
where and the how right - they set in motion a virtuous cycle. By focusing on the
contextual conditions most important to their industries and strategies, companies
ensure that their corporate capabilities will be particularly well suited to helping
grantees create greater value.
Id. at 14.
184. Abbott Labs. v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding that the
Nonprofit Institutions Act exemption for purchases of supplies by a nonprofit hospital for its "own
use" does not exempt all of such a hospital's drug purchases from the Robinson-Patman Act but
only those supplies that reasonably may be regarded as used by the hospital in the sense that such
use is part of and promotes the hospital's intended institutional operation in the care of its
patients). The Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act is an antitrust statute; however, it does
not deal with the same type of conduct as the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(c). Nonetheless,
this is one example where the benefit associated with anticompetitive conduct becomes condoned
because of the broad benefit to the publio such conduct creates. In a further refinement of the
antitrust exemption, the court stated that it would not extend the exemption to those who then
proceeded to sell the product in competitive markets. Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n,
Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 460 U.S. 150 (1983) (holding that state and local government hospitals could
not resell, in competitive markets, pharmaceutical products bought under the antitrust exempted
price discount).
185. Abbott Labs., 425 U.S. at 1313. "Eleemosynary" means, "pertaining to alms or
almsgiving; charitable. . . . It derives from medieval Latin eleemosynarius, 'compassion,
mercy.. . .' World Wide Words at http://www.quinion.com/words/weirdwords/ww-elel.htm (last
modified Feb. 22, 1999).
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A. Public Versus Private Benefit:
For this new (or not so new) analysis to work, the government or
the courts must first determine if a public benefit exists. For this pur-
pose, the tax code provides a particularly appropriate analogy. For
instance, the provision dealing with exempt organizations186 involves an
inquiry into the philanthropic activity of an organization to determine
whether there is any tax liability. Moreover, the inquiry analyzes chari-
table activity that furthers a "religious, charitable, scientific, testing for
public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or for the prevention of
the cruelty to children or animals."1 87 Further expanding the type of
activities sheltered from taxation are
[c]ivic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but organized
exclusively for the promotion of social welfare, or local associations
of employees, the membership of which is limited to the employees
of a designated person of persons in a particular municipality, and the
net earnings of such entity are dedicated exclusively to charitable,
educational, or recreational purposes. 188
As interpreted in the federal tax regulations, guidelines are availa-
ble to determine the purpose of activities within an organization. The
interesting irony in this analogy, however, arises when the government
determines tax exemption; the government must avoid the trap of look-
ing for private benefit as a way to defeat the exemption (i.e., although
there is a private benefit, the fact that there is a predominant public ben-
efit is sufficient to maintain exempt status). 8 9 Conversely, for this anal-
ysis to work, the standard must measure private benefits balanced
against the public benefit. Inasmuch as exempt status is a measurement
to construe public benefit or, arguably, societal gain, the additional pri-
vate benefits available to the company should not create another advan-
tage that could defeat competition.1 90 For this analysis to have any
186. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c) (2001); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)
(2002).
187. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2001); 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (2002); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)
(2002). These categories are used to define the types of objectives that will provide organizations
with tax exemption.
188. 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2001).
189. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 106TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE
OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO
SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986, VOLUME III: ACADEMIC PAPERS
SUBMIrED TO THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 144 (Comm. Print 2001). (Frances R. Hill,
Private Benefit, Public Benefit and Exemption, Prepared for the Joint Committee on Taxation
Simplification Study). See also FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS (2002).
190. See generally Porter & Kramer, supra note 182.
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meaning at all, private benefits need to be distinguished from public
benefit.
There are two perspectives in viewing the distinction between pub-
lic and private: from the giver and from the receiver. Both perspectives
are important to gain an understanding of the difference.' 9' Both
intended and unintended beneficiaries exist, depending on the type of
exempt activity; this parallels the free-rider'9 2 issue in economics.' 93
From this perspective, the public benefit arises regardless of "whether
preventing cruelty to animals or presenting opera or fostering interest in
stamps or any of the other hundreds, if not thousands, of interests
"9194
Next, perhaps adding more difficulty for antitrust discretionary
prosecution, an analysis of the activities from the perspective of the
company with market power should follow. The same activity may eas-
ily create private interest when directed at one group and establish a
valid public benefit if aimed at a different group.19 5 Consider the con-
trast between a gift of football tickets to prospective clients versus the
same gift to economically challenged children - the former demon-
strates private benefit and the latter illustrates public benefit.' 96 As with
most of the previous models, however, this too is simplified because the
standard does not account for the many permutations of activity mixed
with both public and private benefits.
One such complication occurs when the public/private benefit cate-
gory is mixed; in fact, this is when antitrust violations invite this analy-
sis. When the value of the private benefit portion of the activity
becomes substantial, it seems to diminish the value of the public bene-
fit. 19 7 As a clarifying example, the existence of just one private benefit
activity, if it is significant, "destroy[s] the exemption regardless of the
191. Id.
192. See generally Polk Bros., Inc. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185 (7th Cir.
1985). The free-rider concept refers to using the positive benefits arising from an activity
although it was not intended for the one receiving the benefit. In antitrust litigation, a party uses
the free rider doctrine as a defense to the prosecution.
Arguably, the suggested analysis does not pose a free rider problem because the inquiry is
more individualized, as it relates only to the alleged monopolist. If, on the other hand, there were
benefits transferred to non-contributors, that would necessitate a greater isolation in the inquiry.
193. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 189, at 143.
194. Id.
195. See generally id.
196. Id. at 144, n.5.
197. Cf. World Family Corp. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 81 T.C. 958, 966 (1983)
(holding that when there is an otherwise charitable organization, an insubstantial private benefit
endeavor does not defeat the exempt status). It is important to note that the court stated that if the
private benefit activity were substantial there would be no grounds to maintain the exemption.
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number or importance [of public benefits gained.]"' 98 Generally, a pri-
vate benefit is likely associated with the philanthropic activity that gen-
erates a public benefit. However, the private benefit might be
incidental. 199
With the definitions of public-versus-private benefit set forth, the
notion of what "substantial" means requires further clarification. Con-
siderably critical to this analogy, the standard for when a benefit is "sub-
stantial" versus "incidental" is best articulated by the following: "[a]
benefit will be incidental in the quantitative sense if it is insubstantial
when compared with the public benefit provided by the organization.
The quantitative standard is thus not a bright line percentage test but
instead a facts and circumstances test balancing public and private
benefits."2 00
The difficulty exists when a public benefit includes an expressly
private benefit that will generate profit for the subject organization. °1
In light of this conflict, the fact that a substantial portion of the perform-
ance becomes a private benefit is only important if the exempt activity
confers private benefits to the subject company. 20 2 Accordingly, a pri-
vate benefit to the organization that specifically occurs through an activ-
ity for a public purpose defeats its public benefit exemption status.20 3
The tax regulations seem to contain a framework that lends itself to
a better determination of the socially beneficial activities than the argua-
bly ad hoc inquiry used in today's antitrust analysis. Whether the gov-
ernment or the courts conduct this inquiry is not critical to this Comment
because both branches currently conduct the analysis for exempt status.
Either the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") in the first instance, or the
tax court reviewing the IRS's determination, are usually able to deter-
mine whether an organization is exempt °.2 ' Along the same lines, the
public benefit of the company with market power measured against its
corresponding private purpose does not belong in the antitrust analysis.
198. Better Bus. Bureau of Wash., D.C., Inc., v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945).
199. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM., supra note 189, at 152. (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 37789
(Dec. 18, 1978)).
200. Id. (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 37789 (Dec. 18, 1978); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35701 (Mar. 4,
1974); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39862 (Nov. 22, 1991)).
201. Cf United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 165 F.3d 1173, 1174 (7th
Cir. 1999).
202. See generally id.
203. Cf Gen. Couns. Mem. 36157 (Feb. 10, 1975). ("[A]lthough the organization is primarily
engaged in promoting the general welfare of the community, it is not organized and operated
exclusively for charitable purposes. The organization is not, therefore, exempt under Code
§ 501(c)(3)."). The community organization, in doing its work, created a private benefit for its
members. It is unclear where the balance is drawn between the incidental nature and
substantiality of the private benefit versus the public purpose and its benefit.
204. This process could track the exempt organization process of the Tax Court.
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Instead, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") can use the tools pres-
ently used by the IRS. After using this analysis, the FTC would know
which suspect firms to prosecute.2 °5
Consider the case where a company with market power in software
would provide its product for impoverished communities. This is
facially a public benefit; nevertheless, the private purpose could be that
the firm creates path dependence for its product. 206 The follow-up
inquiry would be whether the private benefit is incidental or substan-
tial.20 7 The network effects of the software provided to the underprivi-
leged could be of such a value as to overwhelm the public benefit.20 8
The direct benefit returned to the manufacturer, however, may be so
attenuated that the public purpose survives. This is analogous to the
court's antitrust balancing of the monopolist's negative impact on com-
petition with the economic benefit of the actions of that same
organization.20 9
This suggested adaptation seeks to split antitrust analysis; neverthe-
less, antitrust policy "supplies a general legal framework that can be
called upon by many firms in a variety of industries to secure advantages
over rivals or to obtain protection from competitive market forces."2 1
In so doing, the use of the antitrust laws both protects the competitive
forces in the economy and, through wealth redistribution, keeps the ben-
efits flowing to the public. 2 ' This result occurs because the discretion
used in the application of the law "consider[s] each case on its merits,
weighing the social benefits and costs of the practice at issue in passing
205. Admittedly, this is a simplified description. Importantly, however, the illustration is
appropriate to demonstrate the strategic framework within which the analysis would operate. The
tactical specificity becomes more critical after the scheme is incorporated.
206. Compare Gen. Couns. Mem. 36157 (Feb. 10, 1975) with Baron & Hannan, supra note
181; LEmOWrrZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 2, at 51.
207. See United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1174; See also STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM., supra
note 189, at 152.
208. One such example may be the distribution of free software by America Online for the
purposes of creating a group of users dependant on the service to the exclusion of other Internet
providers. This Comment does not take the naive position that impoverished communities have
access to computers on any expansive scale. Instead, there are circumstances under which the
required hardware may be made available in much the same way as cell phones. A full discussion
of this issue is beyond the scope of this Comment.
209. Some of the analysis that the court undertakes is known as "filtering." Cf Oliver E.
Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, in REVITALIZINo ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY, ESSAYS
ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL POLICY 219 (Harry First et al. eds., 1991). "The purpose of
a filter is to perform a sort between problematic and unproblematic cases." Williamson
differentiates filters based on strategic versus non-strategic factors.
210. See SHURGART, supra note 180, at 53. The quote is from chapter 3, which discusses
business enterprises and the antitrust arena.
211. Id. at 54.
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on its legality. ' 21 2 Thus far, the theme is to decide carefully which
anticompetitive activities to prosecute and then strictly apply the rules
based upon the idea - protect competition.23
Under this approach, fewer governmental prosecutions will occur.
The civil remedies of treble damages and costs2 14 provide enough incen-
tive for private protection of the competitive marketplace. The danger is
that the incentives combined with the current state of antitrust analysis
may lead to abuse of the power to commence litigation.21 5
An opposing view is that companies will limit anticompetitive
behavior because the threat of civil suit remains a deterrent. Indeed, the
reason for the Sherman Act's treble damages provision is to deter
anticompetitive behavior; this is arguably a tactic commonly employed
by legislatures to induce civil enforcement of difficult issues. One rea-
son for reliance on the proposed pre-litigation public benefit standard is
that this proposal concerns only governmental prosecutions. Further-
more, the current competitiveness-versus-benefit analysis favored by
pro-high-tech antitrust commentators, moved to extra-judicial determi-
nations, simplifies the judicial antitrust inquiry.
Thus, the restructured analysis will create easier outcome predic-
tions ultimately showing the concerns about burgeoning civil claims to
be unwarranted.21 6 Moreover, despite the deterrent effect of civil litiga-
tion, at least one additional limitation to the problem of excessive litiga-
tion exists: the fact that high technology markets involve a moving
target217 might create a mootness issue and thus provide further disin-
centive to making the civil claim.2" 8 For instance, while the monopolist
might remain liable for damages during the monopoly period, the lim-
ited time of monopoly dominance shrinks the amount of damages availa-
ble in most cases. This lessened amount of damages would likely deter
the civil claimant due to the risk associated with an unfavorable outcome
versus the expected award from a favorable one.
212. Id. at 180.
213. The challenge is that the Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and the "rule of reason" contain very
vague language with respect to the harm to competition. As such, the strict application of
legislative intent may be the ad hoc inquiry that exists today. On the other hand, the intent was to
protect competition. Under that broad construction, this Comment attempts to fashion a standard
to govern high technology companies.
214. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001).
215. See SHURGART, supra note 180, at 140.
216. Contra id. at 138-54. The entire book argues that antitrust litigation is damaging to the
economy. The private interests will take advantage of the structure to transfer the gains from
competition to the inefficient.
217. See supra text accompanying note 164.
218. See, e.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 327 (1963). See
also Public Utilities Comm'n of the State of California v. F.E.R.C., 236 F.3d 708, 713-14 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Competition is a public good and each individual customer and
supplier has a natural inclination to act as a free rider. The antitrust
laws allow society to make a collective decision that internalizes the
provision of this public good.2'9
Many arguments exist that support companies' contentions, like
Microsoft's, that antitrust is ill-suited for the high-tech market. Yet, the
Sherman Act's drafters understood that, regardless of the breadth of
commerce and competition, the "power of control, [is] unlimited save by
the discretion of Congress. '220 Demonstrating its discretion, Congress
enacted antitrust laws. All of the arguments to avoid the implications of
the Sherman Act use the perception that society benefits (regardless of
whether it is called economic efficiency, consumer benefits, or some
other term) because the products or services are valued. Nevertheless,
that was not the way that Congress chose; it did not condone "good
trusts" and condemn "bad" ones; it forbad all. Moreover, in so doing
it was not necessarily actuated by economic motives alone. It is pos-
sible, because of its indirect social or moral effect, to prefer a system
of small producers, each dependent for his success upon his own skill
and character, to one in which the great mass of those engaged must
accept the direction of a few. These considerations, which we have
suggested only as possible purposes of the Act, we think the deci-
sions prove to have been in fact its purposes.2 2 '
Thus, the likely intent of antitrust laws was to ensure the efficient
operation of the free market and secure long-term benefits to the con-
sumer, the industry, and the economy; in other words, to protect society
from anticompetitive behavior. Although high technology creates many
opportunities to view competitiveness as providing successful firms with
an escape from antitrust liability, the fundamental question remains: Is
the company acting anticompetitively? Regardless of all the variations
of antitrust analysis, when a firm engages in predatory or exclusionary
practices, it should be liable under the Sherman Act.
Predatory and exclusionary behavior tends to reduce the benefits of
219. See Salop & Romaine, supra note 177, at 628.
220. 20 CONG. REC. S3445 at 1457 (1899), reprinted in 3 AMERICAN LANDMARK LEGISLATION
1976, 33 (representing the statements of Sen. Jones).
221. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 427. While subsequent cases may have repudiated
Aluminum Co., the fact remains that the intention of the Sherman Act was to eliminate trusts. See
generally Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993); see also Brooke Group Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). Moreover, this article argues that
the purpose of the antitrust laws is to eliminate anticompetitive behavior that returns no public
benefit to society. As such, the later cases tend to weaken the proscriptions against
anticompetitive behavior to the point that those who would assert a private suit face the
problematic analysis that exists within the antitrust inquiry today.
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innovation because there is a chilling effect on the incentive to develop-
ing new high-tech products. Unfortunately, it is not easy to understand
the impact today on the innovations of the future resulting from the
restricted competition. Accordingly, one could view antitrust litigation
as preventative, punishing the anticompetitive actions of a company to
fashion a remedy that will protect upcoming products. One such remedy
available for the courts is to disgorge an abusive firm's profits. By tak-
ing the profits, the court imposes on the firm what this Comment sug-
gests the firm do on its own: transfer profits back to society.
Redistributing the profits to benefit the public allows the courts to
either maintain or return to a more focused interpretation of the antitrust
laws. Furthermore, watching from the sidelines, the FTC can exercise
discretion in prosecuting companies under the Sherman Act. Looking
for those organizations that actively participate in public benefit through
philanthropy ensures that all anticompetitive activities lack the financial
incentive of extraordinary profits.
Because the philanthropic company's self-disgorgement of monop-
oly profits to society would not be subject to government prosecution,
continuing to operate as a monopoly, therefore, does not seem to have
the same appeal as before. Instead, the company may diversify into
other unrelated markets. In any event, under this construct the result
would be that anticompetitive behavior has no potential return to the
would-be antitrust violator.
As for those companies that do not redistribute monopoly profits,
they face the full force of governmental prosecution. In addition, these
companies also face civil action under antitrust law. The likely effect of
increased civil litigation acts as another deterrent. Perhaps the result
would be fewer anticompetitive acts. After all, is that not the purpose of
antitrust in the first place?
The current judicial inquiry arguably disfavors antitrust litigation if
sufficient economic benefits exist; this Comment argues these benefits
are part of the prevailing social good Thus, the probable outcome of
such an economically focused inquiry leaves the prosecution with a los-
ing case. High-technology antitrust commentators favor different analy-
ses, some of which exist in law today, thereby leaving the antitrust civil
suit severely weakened. This potential or actual atrophy opens the high-
technology market to attack by predatory practices disguised in the cos-
tume of societal good.
As a result, today's high-technology companies are not Robin
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Hoods, acting with grace of courage, but modem footpads, committing
their robberies by stealth.
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